



# Corporate S/MIME Certificates

## Certificate Policy

**Version 2.1**

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## CHANGE HISTORY

Version	Date	Author	Changes
1.0	11/11/2015	AS	First version.
1.1	27/12/2016	AS	Changed company address. Added S/MIME certificates for organizations.
1.2	07/10/2019	AS	§1.3 Clarified that email can only be validated by the CA. §1.7 Updated reference for OCSP protocol. §3.1 Clarifications on the EE naming rules. §3.2 Modified headings for better clarity. §4.2 Clarifications on certificate revocation. §7.2 Updated profile of intermediate CA. §7.3 Updated profile of EE certificate.
2.0	07/11/2023	AS	Document restructuring for better alignment with RFC3647. §1.3.2 and §4.1.2: Added provisions for Enterprise RAs. General document update for compliance with CABF Baseline Requirements for S/MIME Certificates.
2.1	28/08/2024	AS	Correction of typos. § 1.6 Updated acronyms for CAA records. § 1.7 Updated references for CAA records § 4.1 and § 4.2 Updated for compliance with CABF Requirements regarding CAA record processing. §7.2 Updated with details on reasonCodes.

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

Actalis S.p.A. ([www.actalis.it](http://www.actalis.it)) is a leading Italian Trust Service Provider (TSP) since 2002, offering all types of digital certificates and related management services, digital time stamping, certified electronic mail, digital signatures, and other solutions in the field of Public Key Infrastructures (PKI), as well as in other fields pertaining to information security.

## 1.1 Overview

A **Certificate** binds a *public key* (the public component of cryptographic key pair) to an identity, namely a set of information items that identifies an individual or an organization. Such entity, identified in the **Subject** field of the certificate, holds and uses the corresponding *private key*.

The certificate is generated and supplied to the Subject by a trusted third party known as **Certification Authority (CA)**, and is *digitally signed* by the CA. The Subject is also referred to as **Subscriber**, in that it subscribes an agreement with the CA for the issuance and management of the certificate. As long as the certificate has not yet been issued, the Subscriber is referred to as **Applicant**. The term **Applicant Representative** (or **Requestor**) refers to the human agent that materially requests the certificate on behalf of the Applicant.

The reliability of the certificate also depends on the CA's identification and authentication procedures, the obligations and responsibilities between the CA and the Subscriber, and the CA's physical, operational and technical security controls. All these aspects are described in a public document called **Certification Practice Statement (CPS)** or **Certificate Policy (CP)**, depending on the level of detail and broadness of scope (see RFC 3647).

This document is the Actalis' CP relevant to the issuance and management of "Corporate S/MIME certificates", which are Publicly Trusted **Organization-Validated** or **Sponsor-Validated** S/MIME certificates according to the [SMBR], and is integrated by the related CPS for a number of aspects (e.g., physical, technical, and operational controls).

This CP is based on RFC 3647; however, not all topics listed in RFC 3647 are addressed in this document, either because they are covered in the related CPS or because Actalis makes no stipulation about them. As to the topics not addressed here nor in any referenced documents, Actalis does not commit to do anything in particular, or in any particular way.

As regards the certificates governed by this CP, Actalis conforms to the current version of the **Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates** published at <http://www.cabforum.org>. In the event of any inconsistency between this CP and those Requirements, those Requirements [SMBR] shall take precedence over this document.

Actalis also conforms to the current version of the **Mozilla Root Store Policy** [MRSP], the **Microsoft Trusted Root Program** [MTRP], and the **Apple Root Certificate Program** [ARCP], to the extent that they are applicable.

## 1.2 Document name and identification

This document is the **Certificate Policy for Corporate S/MIME certificates** issued by Actalis S.p.A.

## **1.3 PKI participants**

### **1.3.1 Certification Authorities**

The **Certification Authority (CA)** is **Actalis S.p.A.**, headquartered at Via S. Clemente 53, 24036 Ponte San Pietro (BG), Italy, enlisted in the Company Registry of Bergamo under #03358520967.

For certificates issued under this CP, Actalis plays the role of both Root CA and issuing CA.

For the overall structure of the PKI, please refer to the [CPS].

### **1.3.2 Registration Authorities**

**Registration Authorities (RAs)** are the entities performing Identification and Authentication (I&A) of Applicants, their registration into the CA database, and transmission of certificate requests to the CA.

For certificates to be issued to individuals (**SV** certificates), RA tasks may be performed by external organizations (e.g., employers) acting as “Enterprise RA” in compliance with the [SMBR].

For certificates to be issued to organizations (**OV** certificates), RA tasks are performed by Actalis. In all cases, email address validation shall be performed by Actalis only (it cannot be delegated).

#### **1.3.2.1 Enterprise registration authorities**

Organizations meeting the requirements for “Enterprise RAs” set forth in the [SMBR] may be enabled to operate as their own RA, on request, limited to the email domains they own or control. This shall be subject to the stipulation of a suitable agreement between such organizations and Actalis in compliance with the [SMBR].

Depending on the quantity of certificates to be managed, specific customer needs and other factors, Actalis may enable Enterprise RAs to request certificates via a specific web-based application allowing greater autonomy and faster processes.

### **1.3.3 Subscribers**

**Subscribers**, as identified in the Subject field of certificates, may be either **organizations** or **individuals associated with an organization** (e.g., employees). Certificates issued according to this CP are not provided to private individuals.

### **1.3.4 Relying Parties**

**Relying Parties (RPs)** are all entities that rely on the accuracy of the binding between the Subject’s public key distributed via a certificate and the Subject’s identity contained in the same certificate.

## **1.4 Certificate usage**

### **1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses**

Two types of S/MIME certificates are covered by this CP according to the [SMBR] terminology:

- **Organization-Validated (OV)** – issued to an organization (legal person), only contains an organization's identity in addition to an email address;
- **Sponsor-Validated (SV)** – issued to an individual (natural person) associated to an organization (legal person), contains both an individual identity (personal name) and an organization's identity in addition to an email address;

Both types of certificates are mainly intended for **signing and/or encrypting email messages according** to the **S/MIME** standard [SMIME], typically by means of a suitable email application.

A non-committal list of supported email clients can be found on the Actalis' website at the following URL: <https://www.actalis.it/en/certificates-for-secure-electronic-mail.aspx>. Applicants are supposed to review that list before requesting Actalis' S/MIME certificates.

Subscribers are allowed to use the Certificates to sign and/or encrypt data in different ways and for different purposes (i.e., not necessarily according to the S/MIME standard); however, Actalis declines all responsibility for any inconvenience that Subscribers may encounter in that case.

Certificates issued under this CP can also be used for SSL/TLS client authentication [TLS], depending on the target environment; however, Actalis declines all responsibility for any inconvenience that Subscribers may encounter in that case.

Note: It is assumed that Applicants have the competence and the tools required to request, install, and use their Certificates. Otherwise, Actalis is available to offer the necessary consultancy.

#### **1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses**

Any use of the Certificate other than allowed in section 1.4.1 is discouraged and may result in the revocation of the Certificate by Actalis (see also section 4.9.1), depending on the security impact of the use being made of the Certificate.

See also [CPS] for additional provisions.

### **1.5 Policy administration**

#### **1.5.1 Organization administering the document**

This CP is drafted, revised, approved, published and maintained by Actalis S.p.A.

#### **1.5.2 Contact person**

For any questions regarding this CP, please write to [ca-admin@actalis.it](mailto:ca-admin@actalis.it).

For instructions on how to submit a Certificate Problem Report or revocation request, please refer to section 1.5.2 of the reference [CPS].

## **1.6 Definitions and acronyms**

ARL	Authority Revocation List
CA	Certification Authority (see CSP)
CAA	Certification Authority Authorization
CMS	Certificate Management System
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSP	Certification Service Provider (see CA)
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
HSM	Hardware Security Module
HTTP	Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol
I&A	Identification and Authentication
ICA	Intermediate CA
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LEI	Legal Entity Identifier
OID	Object Identifier
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
RA	Registration Authority
S/MIME	Secure MIME
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TLS	Transport Layer Security

## 1.7 References

- [BR] CA/Browser Forum: “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”  
(<https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents/> )
- [SMBR] CA/Browser Forum: “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates” (<https://cabforum.org/smime-br/> )
- [CAA] [RFC 9495](#): “Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Processing for Email Addresses”, October 2023.
- [CPS] Certification Practice Statement - SSL Server and Code Signing certificates  
([https://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/cps\\_for\\_ssl\\_server\\_and\\_code\\_signing\\_en.aspx](https://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/cps_for_ssl_server_and_code_signing_en.aspx) )
- [CSR] [RFC 2314](#): “PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Version 1.5”, March 1998.
- [HTTP] [RFC 2616](#): “Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1”, June 1999.
- [LDAP] [RFC 4511](#): “Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) - The Protocol”, June 2006.
- [MRSP] Mozilla Root Store Policy  
(<https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy>)
- [MTRP] Microsoft Trusted Root Program  
(<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security/trusted-root/program-requirements>)
- [ARCP] Apple Root Certificate Program  
([https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca\\_program.html](https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_program.html) )
- [OCSP] [RFC 6960](#): “X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP”, June 2013.
- [LOSP] [RFC 5019](#): “The Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments”, September 2007.
- [PFW] [RFC 3647](#): “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework”, November 2003.
- [PFX] [RFC 7292](#): “PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange Syntax v1.1”, July 2014.
- [PROF] [RFC 5280](#): “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”, May 2008.
- [XUPD] [RFC 6818](#), “Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”, January 2013.
- [SMIME] [RFC5751](#): “Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification”, January 2010.
- [T&C] S/MIME Certificates – Terms & Conditions  
([https://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/sslclient\\_smime\\_termsconditions.aspx](https://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/sslclient_smime_termsconditions.aspx))
- [TLS] [RFC 5246](#): “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2”, August 2008.

## 2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES

### 2.1 Repositories

Actalis publishes this CP, the related CPS, Terms and Conditions, Subscriber Agreements, and other relevant documentation in the Repository below, freely accessible by anyone on a 24x7 basis:

<https://www.actalis.com/legal-repository.aspx>.

Actalis also publishes revocation information as described in §4.10.

### 2.2 Publication of certification information

As specified in §1.1, this CP is structured in accordance with RFC 3647 and Actalis will adhere to the latest published version of the [SMBR].

### 2.3 Time or frequency of publication

This CP is reviewed and updated at least once per year, also to ensure that it conforms to the latest versions of applicable CAB Forum Requirements and other applicable standards and regulations.

As to the time and frequency of CRL publication, see §4.9.7.

### 2.4 Access controls on repositories

The Actalis Repository is freely accessible by anyone in read-only mode. Only authorized users and systems can write to it, and suitable controls are in place to prevent unauthorized writes.

## 3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&A)

### 3.1 Naming

See section 7.1.4.

#### 3.1.1 Types of names

As per §3.1.1 of the [SMBR].

#### 3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

As per §3.1.2 of the [SMBR].

#### 3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

Pseudonyms are not supported.

#### 3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms

As per §3.1.4 of the [SMBR].

#### 3.1.5 Uniqueness of names

No stipulation.

### **3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks**

No stipulation.

## **3.2 Initial Identity Validation**

### **3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key**

When the Subscriber's private key is generated by Applicant, this latter shall send its public key to the CA as a CSR in PKCS#10 format, as part of the certificate request. In this case the CA, before issuing the certificate, shall check that the CSR is cryptographically valid.

### **3.2.2 Validation of Email Address authorization or control**

The CA SHALL verify that the Applicant controls the email account associated with the Mailbox Address referenced in the Certificate (or has been authorized by the email account holder to act on the account holder's behalf) by one of the following methods:

- by verifying the Applicant's control over the domain portion of the Mailbox Address using one of the methods allowed by the CAB Forum's Baseline Requirements [BR], in compliance with §3.2.2.1 of the [SMBR];
- by sending an email message containing a unique Random Value To the Mailbox Address and receiving a confirming response utilizing the same Random Value, in compliance with §3.2.2.2 of the [SMBR]).

### **3.2.3 Authentication of organization identity**

For all certificates issued under this CP, Actalis shall collect and retain evidence supporting the following identity attributes for the Organization:

- formal name of the Legal Entity (as registered)
- address of the Legal Entity (main place of business)
- Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration of the Legal Entity
- unique identifier and type of identifier for the Legal Entity.

The unique identifier shall be included in the Certificate subject:organizationIdentifier attribute as specified in §7.1.4.2.2 in compliance with the [SMBR].

All these data shall be verified by Actalis by querying reliable independent information sources like e.g., the applicable jurisdiction's company registry, or a governmental database of public agencies, or a LEI data reference, in compliance with §3.2.8 of the [SMBR]. Where such sources are not usable, Actalis may accept a suitable Attestation (e.g., a Lawyer's letter) in line with §3.2.8 of the [SMBR].

### **3.2.4 Authentication of individual identity**

For certificates to be issued to individuals (i.e., Sponsor-Validated certificates), the Applicant's identity (except email address) shall be verified in a reliable way, in compliance with section 3.2.4 of the [SMBR]. Either Actalis or an Enterprise RA shall collect and retain evidence supporting at least the following identity attributes for the individual Applicant:

- given name(s) and surname(s), which shall be current names.

In order to collect these data, any of the methods described in §3.2. 4.1 of the [SMBR] can be employed, depending on specific customers, the certificate request channel, and other factors.

Organizations enabled to act as Enterprise RAs are allowed to use their own records as evidence, subject to the provisions of the related agreement with Actalis.

Validation of the Individual identities shall in any case conform to §3.2.4 of the [SMBR].

### **3.2.5 Non-verified subscriber information**

Actalis does not include in Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates any Subscriber information that has not been verified in accordance with [SMBR].

### **3.2.6 Validation of authority**

Before commencing to issue a Certificate regulated by this CP, Actalis shall use a Reliable Method of Communication to verify the authenticity of the Applicant Representative's certificate request, in line with §3.2.6 of the [SMBR]. To this end, Actalis will normally use one of the following methods:

- Applicant's confirmation by telephone;
- Applicant's confirmation by certified email;
- Applicant's Qualified Electronic Signature (QES) on the certificate application form;
- formal purchase order on the Applicant's organization headed paper;
- a suitable Attestation (e.g., a Lawyer's letter) in line with §3.2.8 of the [SMBR].

Other methods may also be used, depending on the circumstances.

For further details, please refer to §3.2.5 of the [CPS].

### **3.2.7 Criteria for interoperation**

The provisions of §3.2.7 of the [SMBR] apply.

### **3.2.8 Reliability of verification sources**

The provisions of §3.2.8 of the [SMBR] apply.

## **3.3 Identification and authentication for Re-key requests**

No stipulation.

## **3.4 Identification and authentication for Revocation request**

I&A for revocation requests depends on how the request is made and by whom:

- the Subscriber can request the revocation of their certificate online, on a 24x7 basis, by accessing the Actalis portal with the authentication credentials provided to them upon issuance of the certificate;

- an Enterprise RA can request the revocation of certificates, in the circumstances indicated in this CP, either interactively from an Actalis portal, or programmatically by calling an appropriate API, but always subject to authentication of the operator/caller.

## 4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

### 4.1 Certificate Application

#### 4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application

No stipulation.

#### 4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities

The certificate request process varies depending on whether it takes place on the CA website or is mediated by an Enterprise RA.

##### 4.1.2.1 Enrollment from the CA website

In this case:

- Actalis or an Enterprise RA (°) performs I&A according to §3.2
- Actalis registers the Applicant's identity data into the CA database;
- next, Actalis generates a "voucher" code and provides it to the Applicant;
- finally, the Applicant fills in and submits a web-based certificate request form including their Mailbox Address and the said voucher.

(°) When the I&A is performed by an Enterprise RA that does not use the relevant Actalis portal, the Applicant's identity data must still be sent to Actalis in a secure way (e.g., by secure email, or an attachment with digital signature, etc.); the procedure must be agreed with Actalis beforehand.

The "voucher" is used to authenticate the certificate request and to look up the previously validated Applicant's identity information (e.g., organizationName, commonName, etc.) in the CA database.

Submission of the certificate request form requires:

- passing a challenge-response validation of the Applicant's Mailbox Address;
- acceptance of the applicable Terms and Conditions, this CP, and privacy policy.

##### 4.1.2.2 Enrollment from Enterprise RAs

In this case, the Enterprise RA either fills in and submits a certificate request form (from a suitable Actalis portal) or invokes an appropriate API to transmit a certificate request to Actalis. The request may or may not include a CSR depending on the Enterprise RA preferences (see §3.2.1).

Validation of the Applicant's Mailbox Address is based on the *prior validation by Actalis of the relevant domain* (i.e., the domain part of Mailbox Address) for the organization acting as Enterprise RA, therefore it does not require further operations.

The validation of the remaining identity data (e.g., name and surname of the Applicant) is assumed to have been carried out by the Enterprise RA in compliance with their agreement with Actalis and with the [SMBR].

Enterprise RA can only request Sponsor-Validated (SV) certificates.

## **4.2 Certificate application processing**

### **4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions**

Upon receipt of a certificate application with any of the channels/methods described in §4.1, all the verifications described in §3.2 and not yet done are performed either automatically, where feasible and allowed, or manually by a Validation Specialist, in compliance with the [SMBR], according to the certificate type and the specific verification to be done.

Actalis may reuse previous validations and/or supporting evidence for additional certificates to be issued to the same Applicant, to the extent that is permitted by §4.2.1 of the [SMBR].

### **4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications**

Currently, Actalis does not check CAA DNS Resource Records [CAA] for the Mailbox Addresses to be included in certificates. Starting from 15/03/2025 and according to [SMBR], Actalis will check for the presence of a CAA records, before issuing certificates, and will process them according to [CAA] and the [SMBR]. Only upon successfully passing this check will Actalis issue the requested certificates. Also, from 15/03/2025 Actalis will log the results of the CAA checks.

### **4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications**

No stipulation.

## **4.3 Certificate issuance**

### **4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance**

If the previous steps (see §4.2) are completed successfully, the CA system:

- if the Applicant has sent a CSR, checks that the CSR is well-formed and does not contain unexpected data, that the CSR signature is valid, and the Public Key in the CSR is not affected by known weaknesses;
- otherwise, generates a suitable Key Pair for the Applicant;

Next, the CA system generates the Certificate, stores it into its database, and makes it available to the requester in ways that depends on how the certificate was requested (see §4.1).

When an Enterprise RA is not involved, the CA always sends the Certificate to Subscriber via email.

When the Subscriber' Private Key is generated by the CA, the Certificate is made available as a PKCS#12 file whose protection password is provided to the Subscriber over a different channel (es. via HTTPS or SMS). See also 6.1.2 for additional details.

**4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate**

No stipulation.

**4.4 Certificate acceptance****4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance**

No stipulation.

**4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

**4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulation.

**4.5 Key pair and certificate usage****4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage**

See sections 1.4 and 9.6.3.

**4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage**

No stipulation.

**4.6 Certificate renewal**

No stipulation.

**4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal**

No stipulation.

**4.6.2 Who may request renewal**

No stipulation.

**4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests**

No stipulation.

**4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

No stipulation.

**4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate**

No stipulation.

**4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

**4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulation.

## **4.7 Certificate re-key**

In the event that the Subscriber wishes their Certificate to contain a different public key, the Subscriber should request revocation of their current Certificate and apply for a new one.

### **4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key**

No stipulation.

### **4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key**

No stipulation.

### **4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests**

No stipulation.

### **4.7.4 Notification of a new certificate issuance to subscriber**

No stipulation.

### **4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-key certificate**

No stipulation.

### **4.7.6 Publication of the re-key certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

### **4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities**

No stipulation.

## **4.8 Certificate modification**

### **4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification**

In the event that the Subscriber wishes their Certificate to contain different Subject information, the Subscriber should request revocation of their current Certificate and apply for a new one.

### **4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification**

No stipulation.

### **4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests**

No stipulation.

### **4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber**

No stipulation.

### **4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate**

No stipulation.

### **4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA**

No stipulation.

#### 4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

No stipulation.

### 4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

#### 4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

##### 4.9.1.1 Reasons for revoking a subscriber certificate

Actalis shall revoke the certificate **within 24 hours** if one or more of the following occurs:

- the Subscriber requests in writing that Actalis revoke the Certificate;
- the Subscriber notifies Actalis that the original Certificate Request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (\*);
- Actalis obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise; (\*)
- Actalis is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate;
- Actalis obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or mailbox control for any Mailbox Address in the Certificate should not be relied upon.

Actalis shall revoke the certificate **within 5 days** if one or more of the following occurs:

- the Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of §6.1.5 and §6.1.6;
- Actalis obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
- Actalis is made aware that the Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use;
- Actalis is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of an email address or Fully-Qualified Domain Name in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g., a court or arbitrator has revoked the right to use an email address or Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Subscriber has terminated, or the account holder has failed to maintain the active status of the email address or Domain Name);
- Actalis is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate;
- Actalis is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these CP and/or the referenced CPS (\*);
- Actalis determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate (\*);
- Actalis' right to issue Certificates under the [SMBR] expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;
- revocation is required by this CP and/or the referenced CPS; or
- Actalis CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed.

In the cases marked with an asterisk (\*), the Subscriber **must** promptly request revocation of their certificate as soon as they become aware of the circumstance.

#### **4.9.1.2 Reasons for revoking a subordinate CA certificate**

The provisions of §4.9.1.2 of the [SMBR] apply.

#### **4.9.2 Who can request revocation**

The Subscriber, an Enterprise RA, or Actalis can initiate revocation. Additionally, Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports (see section 1.5.2) informing Actalis of reasonable cause to revoke a Certificate.

#### **4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request**

Certificate suspension or revocation may occur on request of the Subscriber or by initiative of the CA itself, depending on circumstance.

The Subscriber may request suspension or revocation of their certificates by accessing the CA web site (using the credentials that were sent upon certificate issuance), and then following the on-screen instructions. The exact address of the web site is included in the same mail by which the certificate is sent to the user.

Enterprise RAs enabled to the related Actalis (see §1.3.2.1) web portal can also request certificate suspension or revocation through that portal.

#### **4.9.4 Revocation request grace period**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.5 Time within CA must process the revocation request**

The provisions of §4.9.5 of the [SMBR] apply.

#### **4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties**

No stipulation.

**Note:** Since a Certificate may be revoked for the reasons listed in §4.9, Relying Parties should check the revocation status of all Certificates that contain a CDP or OCSP pointer.

#### **4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency**

The provisions of §4.9.7 of the [SMBR] apply. In particular, the CRL is regenerated and republished every 24 hours, even in the absence of new certificate status changes after the last CRL issuance.

#### **4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability**

The status of certificates is made available to all Relying Parties in two ways:

- by publishing a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) compliant with RFC 5820;

- by providing an on-line certificate status service based on the OCSP protocol, in compliance with RFC 6960 and RFC 5019.

The HTTP address of the CRL is inserted in the CRLDistributionPoints (CDP) certificate extension, instead the OCSP responder address is inserted in the AuthorityInformationAccess (AIA) extension.

The CRL and OCSP services can be freely accessed by anyone.

The provisions of §4.9.9 of the [SMBR] also apply.

#### **4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements**

The provisions of §4.9.10 of the [SMBR] apply.

#### **4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise**

See §4.9.1.

#### **4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension**

No Stipulation.

#### **4.9.14 Who can request suspension**

No Stipulation.

#### **4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request**

No Stipulation.

#### **4.9.16 Limits on suspension request**

No Stipulation.

### **4.10 Certificate status services**

See §4.9.9.

#### **4.10.1 Operational characteristics**

Revocation entries on a CRL or OCSP Response shall not be removed until after the Expiry Date of the revoked Certificate.

#### **4.10.2 Service availability**

As per §4.10.2 of the [SMBR].

#### **4.10.3 Optional features**

No stipulation.

#### **4.11 End of subscription**

The contract between Actalis and the Subscriber ends when the Subscriber's certificate expires or is revoked, whichever comes first.

#### **4.12 Key escrow and recovery**

##### **4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices**

No stipulation.

##### **4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices**

No stipulation.

### **5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS**

All facility, management, and operations controls applying to this certificate policy are exactly the same as those documented in [CPS], except where otherwise specified hereafter.

#### **5.1 Physical controls**

Same as documented in [CPS].

#### **5.2 Procedural controls**

Same as documented in [CPS].

#### **5.3 Personnel controls**

The personnel employed in the Actalis' certification services has the necessary qualifications, experience, and have undergone suitable training.

#### **5.4 Audit logging procedures**

##### **5.4.1 Types of events recorded**

For the purpose of maintaining a secure environment, the CA logs all relevant events such as CA Certificate and key lifecycle events, Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management events, Security events, attempts to access the system, and requests made to the system. Audit logs are subject to random checks by Actalis' internal auditor and are available to Qualified Auditor.

##### **5.4.2 Frequency of processing audit log**

Same as documented in [CPS].

##### **5.4.3 Retention period for audit log**

Same as documented in [CPS].

##### **5.4.4 Protection of audit log**

Same as documented in [CPS].

#### **5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures**

Same as documented in [CPS].

#### **5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)**

No stipulation.

#### **5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject**

No stipulation.

#### **5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments**

Same as documented in [CPS].

### **5.5 Records archival**

#### **5.5.1 Types of record archived**

The CA and each Delegated Third Party archive all audit data, certificate application information, documentation supporting certificate applications and documentation related to the security of their Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Root CA Systems and Delegated Third Party Systems.

#### **5.5.2 Retention period for archive**

Archives are kept for at least 3 years.

#### **5.5.3 Protection of archive**

Same as documented in [CPS].

#### **5.5.4 Archive backup procedures**

Same as documented in [CPS].

#### **5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records**

Same as documented in [CPS].

#### **5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)**

No stipulation.

#### **5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information**

Same as documented in [CPS].

### **5.6 Key changeover**

No stipulation.

### **5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery**

Same as documented in [CPS].

## **5.8 CA or RA termination**

Same as documented in [CPS].

# **6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

All facility, management, and operations controls applying to this certificate policy are exactly the same as documented in [CPS], except where otherwise specified hereafter.

## **6.1 Key pair generation and installation**

### **6.1.1 Key pair generation**

#### **6.1.1.1 CA key pair generation**

The key pairs of the CA are generated and handled as documented in [CPS].

#### **6.1.1.2 RA key pair generation**

No stipulation.

#### **6.1.1.3 Subscriber key pair generation**

The provisions of §6.1.1.3 of the [SMBR] apply. See also §6.1.2 below.

### **6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber**

Depending on the specific certificate request procedure or channel used, the Subscriber's Private Key may be generated by CA on request by the Applicant. In such a case, the private key is provided to the Subscriber together with the corresponding certificate within a single PKCS#12 file [PFX].

The private key within the PKCS#12 file is encrypted by a password-based encryption algorithm ensuring at least 128 bits of cipher strength, using a random password of suitable length and complexity, in accordance with the [SMBR].

The password needed to decipher the PKCS#12 file is provided to the Subscriber in such a way as to prevent unauthorized parties to get hold of both the PKCS#12 file and the related password. If the password is provided on-line, a TLS channel is used; otherwise, it is delivered via a separate communication channel (e.g., SMS).

Actalis does not archive the PKCS#12 files generated for Subscribers nor the related passwords.

### **6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer**

No stipulation.

### **6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties**

No stipulation.

### **6.1.5 Key sizes**

The provisions of §6.1.5 of the [SMBR] apply.

**6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking**

The provisions of §6.1.6 of the [SMBR] apply.

**6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)**

The provisions of §6.1.7 of the [SMBR] apply.

**6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering controls**

The provisions of §6.2 of the [SMBR] apply.

**6.3 Other aspects of key pair management****6.3.1 Public key archival**

No stipulation.

**6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods**

Certificates issued under this CP and the corresponding private keys shall have a maximum operational period of 3 years (or 1185 days where renewal is supported).

**6.4 Activation data**

No stipulation.

**6.5 Computer security controls**

Same as documented in [CPS].

**6.6 Life cycle technical controls**

No stipulation.

**6.7 Network security controls**

Same as documented in [CPS].

**6.8 Time-stamping**

No stipulation.

## **7 CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES**

### **7.1 *Certificate profile***

#### **7.1.1 Version number**

Certificates are of type X.509 v3.

#### **7.1.2 Certificate content and extensions**

##### **7.1.2.1 *Root CA certificate***

For the Root CA certificate profile, please refer to [CPS].

### 7.1.2.2 Subordinate CA certificate

The certificate of the subordinate CA, used to sign end-entity certificates, has the following profile:

Field	Value	
Version	V3 (2)	
SerialNumber	<includes at least 8 pseudo-random bytes>	
Signature	sha256WithRSAEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)	
Issuer	CN = Actalis Authentication Root CA O = Actalis S.p.A./03358520967 L = Milano C = IT	
Validity	<10 years>	
Subject	CN = Actalis Client Authentication CA <b>GM</b> O = Actalis S.p.A. L = Ponte San Pietro ST = Bergamo C = IT	
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	<RSA public key of 4096 bits>	
SignatureValue	<Root CA signature>	
Extension	Critical?	Value
Basic Constraints	True	CA=true, pathLenConstraint=0
AuthorityKeyIdentifier (AKI)		<Same value as the Root CA SKI extension>
SubjectKeyIdentifier (SKI)		<public key SHA1-digest>
KeyUsage	True	keyCertSign, cRLSign
ExtendedKeyUsage (EKU)		clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2), emailProtection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
CertificatePolicies		PolicyOID = 2.5.29.32.0 (anyPolicy), CPS-URI = <HTTP link to Actalis' legal repository>
SubjectAlternativeName (SAN)		<not included>
AuthorityInformationAccess (AIA)		<HTTP address of OCSP responder>
CRLDistributionPoints (CDP)		<HTTP address to access the ARL>, <LDAP address to access the ARL>

### 7.1.2.3 Subscriber certificates

#### 7.1.2.3.1 Organization Validated (OV)

The profile of OV end entity certificates is as follows:

Base field	Value	
Version	V3 (2)	
SerialNumber (hex)	<includes at least 8 pseudo-random bytes>	
Signature	sha256WithRSAEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)	
Issuer	<Subject of the Subordinate CA – see §7.1.2.2>	
Validity	notBefore = <issuance time> notAfter = <12, 24, or 36 months later, depending on contract>	
Subject	CN = <same as the O attribute> O = <full registered name of Subscriber > organizationIdentifier = <Subscriber's registration reference according to a registration scheme allowed by [SMBR]> L = <locality of the Subscriber> ST = <state or province of the Subscriber> C = <ISO 3166 country code of Subscriber>	
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	<public RSA key of length 2048 bits>	
SignatureValue	<Subordinate CA signature value>	
Extension	Critical?	Value
Basic Constraints	True	cA=FALSE
AuthorityKeyIdentifier (AKI)		KeyID=<SHA1 hash of the CA public key>
SubjectKeyIdentifier (SKI)		<SHA1 hash of Subject public key>
KeyUsage	True	digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
ExtendedKeyUsage (EKU)		clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2), emailProtection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
CertificatePolicies		CABF organization-validated legacy (2.23.140.1.5.2.1)
SubjectAlternativeName (SAN)		rfc822Name=<email address of the subscriber>
AuthorityInformationAccess (AIA)		caIssuers: <URL of the issuing CA> ocsp: <URL of OCSP responder>
CRLDistributionPoints (CDP)		<HTTP URL of the CRL>

### 7.1.2.3.2 Sponsor Validated (SV)

The profile of SV end entity certificates is as follows:

Base field	Value	
Version	V3 (2)	
SerialNumber (hex)	<includes at least 8 pseudo-random bytes>	
Signature	sha256WithRSAEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)	
Issuer	<Subject of the Subordinate CA – see §7.1.2.2>	
Validity	notBefore = <issuance time> notAfter = <12, 24, or 36 months later, depending on contract>	
Subject	CN = <Name and Surname [givenName = <Subscriber's forename>] [surname = <Subscriber's surname>] O = <full registered name of Subscriber's organization> organizationIdentifier = <Subscriber's registration reference according to a registration scheme allowed by [SMBR]> L = <locality of the Subscriber's organization> ST = <state or province of the Subscriber's organization> C = <ISO 3166 country code of Subscriber's organization>	
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	<public RSA key of length 2048 bits>	
SignatureValue	<Subordinate CA signature value>	
Extension	Critical?	Value
Basic Constraints	True	cA=FALSE
AuthorityKeyIdentifier (AKI)		KeyID=<SHA1 hash of the CA public key>
SubjectKeyIdentifier (SKI)		<SHA1 hash of Subject public key>
KeyUsage	True	digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
ExtendedKeyUsage (EKU)		clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2), emailProtection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
CertificatePolicies		CABF sponsor-validated legacy (2.23.140.1.5.3.1)
SubjectAlternativeName (SAN)		rfc822Name=<email address of the subscriber>
AuthorityInformationAccess (AIA)		caIssuers: <URL of the issuing CA> ocsp: <URL of OCSP responder>
CRLDistributionPoints (CDP)		<HTTP URL of the CRL>

### 7.1.2.4 All certificates

Further Subject attributes and/or extensions may be present in Subscriber certificates, in compliance with RFC5280 and the [SMBR], subject to verification by the CA, depending on specific projects and customers. See also section 3.1.

### 7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

The provisions of §7.1.3 of the [SMBR] apply.

#### 7.1.4 Name forms

Attribute values are encoded according to RFC 5280.

##### 7.1.4.1 Name encoding

The provisions of §7.1.4.1 of the [SMBR] apply.

##### 7.1.4.2 Subject information - subscriber certificates

The Subject field of Subscriber certificates include the following attributes:

###### Organization-Validated (OV) certificates

- **commonName** (CN) – contains the same value as the **organizationName** attribute;
- **organizationName** (O) – contains the full registered name of the Subscriber (legal entity);
- **organizationIdentifier** – contains a Registration Reference for the legal entity indicated in the **organizationName** attribute (i.e., the Subscriber), assigned in accordance to one of the Registration Schemes allowed by the [SMBR];
- **localityName** (L) – contains the full name of the locality where the Subscriber resides (main place of business);
- **stateOrProvinceName** (ST) – contains the full name of the state or province where the Subscriber resides (main place of business);
- **countryName** (C) – contains the ISO 3166 2-letter code of the country where the Subscriber resides (main place of business);

###### Sponsor-Validated (SV) certificates

- **commonName** (CN) – contains the forename and the surname of the Subscriber separated by a blank;
- optional **givenName** – if present, contains the Subscriber's forename;
- optional **surName** – if present, contains the Subscriber's surname;
- **organizationName** (O) – contains the full registered name of the Subscriber's organization (legal entity);
- **organizationIdentifier** – contains a Registration Reference for the legal entity indicated in the **organizationName** attribute (i.e., the Subscriber's organization), assigned in accordance to one of the Registration Schemes allowed by the [SMBR];
- **localityName** (L) – contains the full name of the locality where the Subscriber's organization resides (main place of business);
- **stateOrProvinceName** (ST) – contains the full name of the state or province where the Subscriber's organization resides (main place of business);
- **countryName** (C) – contains the ISO 3166 2-letter code of the country where the Subscriber's organization resides (main place of business);

Other attributes MAY be present in the certificate Subject field in compliance with RFC 5280 and the [SMBR], subject to verification by the CA or RA, depending on specific projects and customers.

The **SubjectAlternativeName** (SAN) extension always contains the Subscriber's **Mailbox Address** as verified by the CA. No other SAN forms are inserted into the certificate.

#### **7.1.4.3 Subject information - root certificates and subordinate CA certificates**

The provisions of §7.1.4.3 of the [SMBR] apply.

#### **7.1.5 Name constraints**

Actalis may issue, subject to a contractual agreement, Subordinate CA certificates to external entities, signed by an Actalis' root CA key. In such a case, the Subordinate CA certificate will be technically constrained in compliance with section 7.1.5 of the [SMBR].

#### **7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier**

The provisions of §7.1.6 of the [SMBR] apply.

#### **7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension**

No stipulation.

#### **7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics**

No stipulation.

#### **7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension**

No stipulation.

### **7.2 CRL Profile**

Actalis issues CRLs compliant with [PROF] and section 7.2 of the [SMBR].

Depending on the cause of revocation, CRL entries may contain one of the following reasonCodes in their CRLReason extension, according to section 7.2 of the [SMBR]

- unspecified (0);
- keyCompromise (1);
- affiliationChanged (3);
- superseded (4);
- cessationOfOperation (5);
- privilegeWithdrawn (9).

### **7.3 OCSP profile**

The provisions of §7.3 of the [SMBR] apply.

## **8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS**

Actalis shall issue certificates and operate its PKI in accordance with the applicable law, shall comply with the [SMBR], and shall comply with the audit requirements described hereafter.

### ***8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment***

The compliance of the Actalis' CA services to this CP, to Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 ("eIDAS"), to the applicable ETSI standards and to the [SMBR] requirements is verified on an annual basis by an accredited Conformity Assessment Body (CAB). Moreover, always on an annual basis, an internal auditing activity is performed on the CA services that also takes into account aspects related to information security, applicable data protection rules and internal policies and procedures.

### ***8.2 Identity and qualification of assessor***

Audits on the CA are carried out by a Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) accredited in compliance with Regulation (EC) no. 765/2008, through personnel qualified and competent on the subject of conformity assessments, according to the ETSI EN 319 403 norm, of Trust Service Providers and the related trust services provided under the eIDAS Regulation. Any second part audits are also performed by accredited bodies in compliance with Regulation (EC) no. 765/2008.

### ***8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity***

The Assessment Bodies (CABs) that perform audits on the CA service, and possibly on the external RAs that collaborate with the CA, have no relationship with Actalis. The internal auditor does not belong to the organizational structure that deals with CA activities.

### ***8.4 Topics covered by assessment***

The audits performed on the CA are based on "ETSI EN 319 411-1 v1.3.1 or newer" or "ETSI EN 319 411-2 v2.4.1 or newer", which includes normative references to ETSI EN 319 401, and the [SMBR].

### ***8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency***

The actions resulting from any non-compliance detected during audits (failure to meet the requirements defined in the regulations, standards, and applicable procedures) depend on the nature and severity of the non-compliance detected, on the rules for the management of non-compliances defined by the Assessment Body (CAB) and/or the internal non-conformity management procedures. In general, if a substantive non-compliance results from an audit, Actalis will develop a remedy plan as quickly as possible. This plan could result in changes to CA certification policies and/or practices, and/or to the CA software. The plan will be presented to the Actalis direction for approval, and then to any third parties with whom Actalis has commitments in this regard.

### ***8.6 Communication of results***

The provisions of §8.6 of the [SMBR] apply.

### ***8.7 Self-audits***

The provisions of §8.7 of the [SMBR] apply.

## **8.8 Review of delegated parties**

The provisions of §8.8 of the [SMBR] apply.

# **9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS**

For more details on legal matters related to certificates issued under this CP, the reader is referred to the Terms & Conditions [T&C] published on the CA web site.

## **9.1 Fees**

Certificates issued according to this CP are priced depending on volumes, duration (validity period), any possible customer-specific requirements and other factors. Quotes will be provided to interested parties on request.

## **9.2 Financial responsibility**

Actalis is suitably insured against the risks related to its certification services.

## **9.3 Confidentiality of business information**

As specified in [CPS].

## **9.4 Privacy of personal information**

### **9.4.1 Privacy plan**

The Actalis' privacy policy is published at the following address:

[https://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/sslclient\\_smime\\_privacy\\_information.aspx](https://www.actalis.it/documenti-en/sslclient_smime_privacy_information.aspx)

### **9.4.2 Information treated as private**

The provisions of §9.4.2 of the [SMBR] apply.

### **9.4.3 Information not deemed private**

No stipulation

### **9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information**

The provisions of §9.4.4 of the [SMBR] apply.

### **9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information**

The provisions of §9.4.5 of the [SMBR] apply.

### **9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process**

No stipulation.

### **9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances**

No stipulation.

## 9.5 Intellectual property rights

Actalis S.p.A. and Aruba S.p.A. own the intellectual property rights in Actalis' services, including the certificates, trademarks used in providing the services, and this CP. Subscribers keep all the rights on their own trademarks, brand names, and their own domain names. Private Keys and Public Keys remain the property of the Subscribers who rightfully hold them.

## 9.6 Representations and warranties

### 9.6.1 CA representations and warranties

By issuing a Certificate, Actalis makes the following warranties to all beneficiaries:

- **Right to Use Mailbox Address:** at the time of issuance, the CA implemented and followed a procedure, as documented in this CP, for verifying that the Applicant either had the right to use, or had control of, the Mailbox Addresses included in the Certificate (or was delegated such right or control by someone who had such right to use or control);
- **Authorization for Certificate:** at the time of issuance, the CA implemented and followed procedure, as documented in this CP, for verifying that the Subject authorized the issuance of the Certificate and that the Applicant Representative is authorized to request the Certificate on behalf of the Subject;
- **Accuracy of Information:** at the time of issuance, the CA implemented and followed a procedure, as documented in this CP, for verifying the accuracy of all of the information contained in the Certificate;
- **Identity of Applicant:** at the time of issuance, the CA implemented and followed a procedure, as documented in this CP, to verify the identity of the Applicant in accordance with §3.2 and §7.1.4.2.2 of the [SMBR];
- **Subscriber Agreement:** the Subscriber has accepted a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use that meets the [SMBR];
- **Status:** the CA maintains a 24 x 7 publicly-accessible Repository with current information regarding the status (Valid or Revoked) of all unexpired Certificates;
- **Revocation:** the CA will revoke the Certificate for any of the reasons specified in the [SMBR] and §4.9.1 of this CP.

### 9.6.2 RA representations and warranties

Before allowing any entity to act as **Registration Authority (RA)**, Actalis will stipulate with that entity a specific *agreement* including at least the following obligations for the RA:

- read and accept all the provisions of this CP and the related CPS;
- collect, verify, and archive suitable evidence corroborating the identity of Applicants, in compliance with the [SMBR], in particular the Applicants' Personal Names (given names and surnames);
- promptly request the revocation of certificates, issued at their request, which include inaccurate or no longer valid Subject identity data (e.g., personal names, email addresses, etc.).

### 9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties

Actalis shall require, as part of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use, that the Applicant make the following commitments and warranties:

- **Accuracy of Information:** provide true and accurate information to the CA or RA;
- **Protection of Private Key:** adopt suitable measures to avoid compromise of their own private keys, including the adoption of suitable measures to avoid unwanted disclosure of secret codes (e.g., the passwords) obtained from the CA or the RA;
- **Acceptance of Certificate:** install and start using the certificate only after having checked that it contains correct information;
- **Use of Certificate:** use the certificate only in the ways and for the purposes provided for in this CP and in compliance with all applicable laws;
- **Reporting and Revocation:** promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it and its associated Private Key...
  - if there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key,
  - or if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate;
- **Termination of Use of Certificate:** promptly cease all use of the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key included in the Certificate upon revocation of that Certificate for reasons of Key Compromise;
- **Responsiveness:** respond to the CA's instructions concerning Key Compromise or Certificate misuse within a specified time period.
- **Acknowledgment and Acceptance:** acknowledge and accept that the CA is entitled to revoke the Certificate immediately if the Applicant were to violate the terms of the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use, or if revocation is required by this CP and/or the related CPS, or by the [SMBR].

### 9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties

**Relying Parties** are supposed to:

- make a reasonable effort to acquire a sufficient understanding of certificates and PKIs;
- verify the status of certificates by accessing the information services described in §4.10;
- only rely on certificates that are not expired, suspended or revoked.

### 9.6.5 Representation and warranties of other participants

No stipulation.

## 9.7 Disclaimers of warranties

The CA has no further obligations and shall not be obliged to guarantee anything more than what is expressly described in this CP or prescribed by applicable law.

**9.8 Limitations of liability**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.9 Indemnities**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.10 Term and termination**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.12 Amendments**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.13 Dispute resolution provisions**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.14 Governing law**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.15 Compliance with applicable law**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.16 Miscellaneous provisions**

Please refer to [CPS].

**9.17 Other provisions**

No stipulation.

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